ai-generated-8229299_1280
Image by Basanta Mondal from Pixabay

You may have noticed that the SEC has been very quiet on the rulemaking front in recent weeks.  It comes as no surprise, as action on a number of items on the SEC’s Regulatory Flexibility Agenda had been moved from late 2024 to early 2025.  (The cynic in me wonders whether the scheduling changes resulted from concerns that accusations of over-regulation would impact the 2024 election cycle, but – for now, at least – I’ll leave that to others.)

However, the SEC has definitely not been idle.  Quite the contrary.  In fact, recent weeks have seen what strikes me as an inordinate number of announcements of enforcement actions.  Some of these actions are relatively “standard” – insider trading, recordkeeping violations, securities fraud, whistleblower protection violations (discussed in our recent e-alert), and so on. But others are somewhat unusual. For example:

Continue Reading Law and Order: SEC
caution-5096068_1280
Image by Ryan F from Pixabay

For many years, I have urged companies to consider going beyond the bare minimum disclosures required by SEC rules – in appropriate circumstances, of course.  In my experience, providing more disclosure than what is specified in the rules can generate positive feedback or even praise from investors and other stakeholders.  And, in fact, many companies do go beyond the rules.  For example:

  • Does your proxy statement include photos of your board members?  The rules don’t require that, but it can certainly help to create the impression – hopefully valid – that your directors are actual human beings and can also demonstrate your board’s diversity.
  • How about including a proxy statement summary that points out your company’s strong governance practices or demonstrates that it really does pay for performance?  Again, the rules don’t require a summary. However, given the incredibly limited amount of time that most investors spend reading your proxy statement, a summary can prove very helpful – and can generate support for your nominees and the board’s position on shareholder proposals and other voting matters.
  • Do you explain the roles of your board and its committees in overseeing areas such as sustainability or diversity?  Again, not required, but in my experience those disclosures can convey that your board is on top of its responsibilities.

However, at the risk of stating the obvious, any voluntary disclosures have to meet the same standards as required disclosures.  In other words, they must be accurate and complete and must not omit information that would make the disclosure incorrect or misleading. This was most recently brought home in a case involving Keurig Dr Pepper Inc.

The facts of the case, as recited in the SEC Order in the case, include that:

  • The company had conducted consumer research in 2016 indicating that, for some consumers, environmental concerns were a significant factor in deciding whether to purchase a Keurig brewing system.
  • Following a change in the composition of its “pods,” the company conducted testing to determine whether the newly formulated pods could, in fact, be recycled.  Two major recycling companies participating in the test “conveyed significant negative feedback to Keurig regarding the commercial feasibility of…recycling of pods at that time.”
  • Despite that feedback, the company’s 10-Ks for 2019 and 2020 stated that “we have conducted extensive testing with municipal recycling facilities to validate that [pods] can be effectively recycled.”  However, the negative feedback was not also disclosed.
  • The 10-K for 2021 did not contain the disclosures cited above.

In finding the above statements in violation of Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 13a-1 thereunder, the SEC imposed a fine of $1,500,000, and the company entered into a cease and desist order.

The statements in Keurig’s 10-Ks were not required; the SEC Order suggests that they were included in order to appeal to the company’s environmentally conscious customers and, possibly investors.  However, the company seems to have overlooked that the rules applicable to required disclosure apply equally to voluntary disclosure.

spot-862274_1280
Image by morzaszum from Pixabay

One of the things I learned as young securities lawyer was that securities offerings can be made only by prospectus.  Accordingly, one of the first things we did whenever we embarked on an IPO was to send a memo to our clients reminding them of the limitations imposed on communications under the securities laws and alerting them to the risks associated with gun-jumping.  (For the record, the term “gun-jumping” is sometimes referred to as “conditioning the market” for an offering, but in plain English it means hyping the offering.)

Unfortunately, some of our clients didn’t follow our advice, in some cases unintentionally and in other cases willfully or even due to arrogance.  (One client told me that the SEC couldn’t limit his First Amendment right to free speech, even though he’d been advised that commercial speech doesn’t necessarily get First Amendment protection.)  And while the principal remedy for gun-jumping – the imposition of a cooling-off period before the offering can be completed – may not seem severe, it can be a deal-killer.  In one case, the SEC imposed a cooling-off period because an interview with the issuer’s CEO generated a story in several major newspapers shortly before the offering was to be priced.  (Notably, the SEC did not cut the issuer any slack because the interview had been given several months earlier, before work on the offering had even begun.)  Of course, even in those good old days, timing was everything when it came to pricing, and the delay imposed by the SEC had to be extended by the issuer because the market had turned and the offering was no longer viable.  Given the volatility of today’s market, the consequences might be worse.

Over the years, people may have forgotten about gun-jumping, or assumed that it is no longer an issue.  Liberalization of some SEC rules associated with communications and terms such as “free writing prospectus” may have given the impression that there is no such thing as gun-jumping.  But it never went away, and as recently as 2020 an offering with which I was familiar nearly went awry due to gun-jumping concerns.

Then came this week’s news about a delay in the much-ballyhooed IPO of Pershing Square.  To my knowledge, the issuer has not explained the reason for the delay, but media reports have stated that it resulted from the facts that the issuer’s CEO sent an “internal communication” about the offering to investors in the issuer’s investment manager, and that the information contained in the communication was not included in the preliminary prospectus and may have been inconsistent with the preliminary prospectus.

Given the market interest in the deal well before the delay was implemented, it seems unlikely that the delay will seriously impact the timing or success of the offering.  However, the episode may serve as a reminder that old rules never die and may not even fade away.

fax-1889050_1280

The week of June 24, 2024 may be remembered as one of the worst in recent memory for the SEC, which – along with the “administrative state” generally – was beaten up by some very significant decisions handed down by the U.S. federal courts.

Securities Fraud Claims Seeking Civil Penalties Must Be Brought in Federal Court

On June 27, the U.S. Supreme Court announced its decision in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Jarkesy, holding that the SEC must bring securities fraud actions seeking civil penalties before a federal court, rather than before the Commission or an administrative law judge. 

The Dodd-Frank Act, enacted in the wake of the financial crisis in the early years of the 21st century, authorized the SEC to impose civil penalties without having to resort to the federal courts.  Pursuant to this authority, the SEC brought an enforcement action against the defendants in Jarkesy in 2013, alleging violations of the antifraud provisions of federal securities laws, opting for proceedings before an administrative law judge.  The proceedings resulted in a civil penalty of $300,000 and other remedies.  Upon review, the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the SEC’s order on three grounds, and the SEC appealed to the Supreme Court.

In its decision, SCOTUS addressed only one of the Fifth Circuit’s bases for vacating the SEC order – namely, that the pursuit of civil remedies for antifraud violations violated the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.  According to the majority opinion, actions resembling a common law cause of action for which remedies are traditionally available at common law must be brought in federal court.  Because the violations alleged in Jarkesy are similar to common law fraud (claims that were “legal rather than equitable”), the Court found that the action should have been brought in federal court.

The impact of Jarkesy remains to be seen. For example, it does not appear to apply to matters not involving common law causes of action, even when those matters result in a civil penalty, such as the SEC’s recent enforcement action against R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., or where other remedies, such as disgorgement, are sought.  However, the admonition to “watch this space” seems applicable here.

The SEC’s Rescission of Proxy Advisory Firm Rules Is Vacated

The Jarkesy decision came just one day after a Fifth Circuit decision vacating the SEC’s 2022 rescission of rules affecting proxy advisory firms that had been adopted a mere two years earlier. 

The rules adopted in 2020 imposed a number of requirements on proxy advisory firms, such as Institutional Shareholder Services and Glass Lewis.  Among other things, the rules required proxy advisory firms (1) to promptly notify companies of their voting recommendations and (2) to notify their investor clients of companies’ written responses to those recommendations.  The following year, the SEC proposed to “amend” these requirements – i.e., to rescind them – and adopted those amendments the following year.  This flip-flop surprised and frustrated many constituencies, including corporate America, resulting in the litigation in question.

In its opinion, the Fifth Circuit found the SEC’s actions in reversing the rule to be arbitrary and capricious.  Among other things, the Court noted that “[t]he 2020 rule[s] never went into effect” and also commented on the questionable timing of the proposal to rescind the rules:

“The agency’s proposal… was published in November 2021, following a closed-door meeting between Chairman Gensler and opponents of the 2020 [rules]… .  The comment period for the proposal was thirty-one days and encompassed portions of the Thanksgiving, Hanukkah, and Christmas holidays…. Unsurprisingly, far fewer comments were filed during this highly truncated period than had addressed the 2019 Proposed Rule. After the comment period closed, the SEC adopted the proposed rescission over the dissent of two commissioners.”

It seems likely if not certain that the SEC will appeal the Fifth Circuit’s decision, but the Jarkesy decision and a third decision handed down this week, discussed below, suggest that the appeal’s success is far from assured.

Chevron “Deference” Falls by the Wayside

To end the week, on June 28 SCOTUS handed down its decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo.  While this case does not involve the SEC, it will likely be the most significant of them all.  Specifically, the decision overturned a 1984 precedent, in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, that permitted judges to defer to federal agencies’ interpretations of law in rulemaking.  In striking down the so-called “Chevron deference” doctrine, the Court stated that it improperly prioritized the legal interpretations of the executive branch over those of the judicial branch. 

While this decision impacts many agencies other than the SEC, it seems likely if not certain that the SEC’s rulemaking decisions will come under greater scrutiny and be subject to more second-guessing by the federal courts than is currently the case.  

The Moral of the Story?

The moral of this story, at least for now, seems to be that if you don’t like an SEC rule or practice, just wait around.  It will likely be challenged.  And, based on these and other cases, the federal courts – and, in particular, the Fifth Circuit – appear willing to oblige.

money-7881948_1280

Once upon a time, few if any investors seriously challenged executive pay.  Executive compensation was, as always, a hot topic, but in the days before say-on-pay votes, it wasn’t easy to effectively object to excessive pay packages.  Moreover, as one of the more outspoken members of the investor community once told me, as long as a company was performing well for its stockholders, investors weren’t going to second-guess the board on the subject. 

That changed in the early 2000s, when Ray Irani, the man who succeeded Armand Hammer as CEO of Occidental Petroleum, was voted out as a board member after pulling down $1.2 billion in compensation over 20-year period, an average of $54 million a year.  (For you young folk, Armand Hammer is not to be confused with his great-grandson, the actor Armie Hammer.  Perhaps more about the elder Hammer in another post.)   While $54 million per year doesn’t sound like much by today’s standards, it was a big deal at the time.  And when I asked the same investor what prompted the rebellion, the response was, in effect, “sometimes too much is just too much.”

Perhaps.  And objections to outlandish or outrageous executive pay did increase, leading, among other things, to the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act requiring most public companies to hold periodic “say-on-pay” votes.  However, these votes have rarely failed (unless you agree with Institutional Shareholder Services that anything less than 70% support for a say on pay vote is a failing grade), and it’s no secret that executive compensation has soared.

At this point, a digression seems appropriate.  Many years ago, I attended a conference at which one of the speakers was a highly regarded compensation consultant.  During her remarks, she pointed out that every single initiative to control executive compensation, whether from the government, investors, or others, had been followed by an increase in executive pay.  History continues to prove her correct.

Moreover, it seems to me that there has always been one glaring exception to the increased levels of investor concern about executive pay – namely, the founder/CEO.  Think about it – the founder/CEOs of companies such as Apple, Amazon, Google, and so on have become among the world’s wealthiest people, without anything close to the degree of squawking that occurs when a “regular” CEO rakes it in.  It’s an understandable exception – someone who creates something out of nothing, particularly when that “something” is an enormous, successful enterprise that employs thousands of people, arguably deserves a break – and big bucks.

Now comes Elon Musk, a once-admired founder/CEO who has become something of an enfant terrible.  His ginormous special bonus – which has been valued at more than $50 billion (eat your heart out, Mr. Irani) – was overturned by the Delaware courts after having been approved by stockholders, and is now being resubmitted for shareholder approval.  I won’t be shocked if the stockholders approve it once more, but given some of Mr. Musk’s troubles – ranging from sales declines and layoffs at Tesla to the questionable distraction of his purchase of X (FKA Twitter), his sometimes odd behavior, and other problems – I also won’t be shocked if the reproposal fails.  If that happens, I wonder whether the pass that seems to have been given to other founder/CEOs will begin to evaporate, and if they will be held to the same standard as those “regular” CEOs.

I also wonder if the whole saga will cause companies to be more thoughtful about how they justify high levels of compensation.  I doubt it, but anyone who reads proxy statements knows that some of these justifications are questionable.  For example, so many proxy statements say, in effect, that high compensation is necessary to retain talented executives.  I may be wrong, but in my experience CEOs love being CEOs and in at least some instances would stay even if their pay were cut.  To say nothing of the fact that when you’re pulling down tens of millions a year, it seems questionable that you need tens of millions more to make you happy. 

tombstone-7001039_1280

I’ll start by making a few things clear: I support a clean environment, stopping or slowing climate change, and many other good things.  I also believe that corporations should (and many do) consider constituencies other than shareholders and seek to do more than increase shareholder value.   There.  I’ve gotten that out of my system.

But that doesn’t mean that I support “ESG” – the term, not the concept.  In fact, I’ve disliked the term ever since it became the acronym du jour.  Aside from the fact that I’m not a fan of acronyms generally, I struggled with “ESG” from the get-go for more substantive reasons.

First and foremost, I didn’t and don’t like the concept of bundling all things bright and beautiful into one easy-to-remember buzz word (or acronym).  It reminded me of some classmates in college who took copious notes in class, reduced their notes to 3X5 index cards, and then kept reducing those cards to the point where I figured they should be able to walk into the final exam, write one all-encompassing word in their blue book (remember those?), and get an A+.  That bothered (and still bothers) me, because life just isn’t that simple.

Another way of looking at it is that the components of ESG, when viewed separately, constitute a large percentage of all the things that companies and their boards need to consider these days.  Take “S” for example.  Presumably, it stands for “social,” and that includes a broad range of workforce and workplace issues, ranging from pay equity to safe workplace environments to diversity, equity, and inclusion (note that I have not used the acronym for those three matters), the company’s role in the communities in which it operates, and beyond.  Then go to “G” next.  It stands for “governance” – again, a very broad topic that has been the subject of many books, articles, and so on.  “E” may be the simplest of the three, but that doesn’t mean it’s simple.  Moreover, the factors that impact E, S, and G are all over the lot, and factors that impact one of the three may or may not impact either or both of the others.   

Among other things, the foregoing suggests that a board committee assigned oversight responsibility for oversight of ESG is taking on a huge and insurmountable task.  No wonder I’ve heard board members complain that they don’t know which committees have or should have responsibility for ESG!  

As if that weren’t enough, several pundits suggested that the term “ESG” was insufficient because it might be viewed as excluding certain things.  One pundit (whom I shall refrain from identifying) suggested that the proper term was “EESG,” with the first “E” standing for “employees.”  I heard other suggestions as well.  If this had gone on much longer, we might have ended up with something like supercalifragilisticexpialidocious.  (If you’ve never seen Mary Poppins, deal with it.)

Accordingly, I think we’d all have been much better off if the term had not been invented, and if those who invented it had instead tried to address its components instead.  Hence the title of this posting (get it – “Rest in Pieces”?).

One last thing: Just because I don’t like the term ESG doesn’t mean I support the anti-ESG movement.  The folks in that movement haven’t joined it because they don’t like acronyms or for the other reasons I’ve given above.  Rather, it’s pretty clear that they oppose the things I believe in.

luxury-1961577_1280

Travel on corporate jets is alluring.  I’ve had the pleasure, and it really is a pleasure.  No TSA, nobody squishing you on both sides.  No worry about checked bags not getting there, and so on.  It’s no wonder that people love it so much.

However, there can be too much of a good thing.  My experience suggests – actually, it screams – that some executives literally can never get enough of it and become positively lustful for travel on “the plane.”  In fact, someone once told me that the scent of jet fuel that one encounters when traveling on a corporate jet must be an aphrodisiac.  Not for THAT, but rather for more travel on the corporate jet.   And not only do executives turn themselves into pretzels to use the plane; they also do so to convince their employers (and themselves) that a trip that screams “personal use” is actually legitimate business travel.

The SEC has known about this for a long time; hence the frequency of enforcement actions against companies that under-report – sometimes by a lot – or totally fail to report executives’ personal use of corporate aircraft. But as is the case with so many SEC proceedings these days, a slap on the wrist or even a fine is a yawner without so much as a tinge of moral opprobrium.  

That may soon change. 

On February 21, 2024, the New York Times reported that the IRS “would begin cracking down on corporate jet owners that abused the tax codes by claiming millions of dollars in deductions on airplanes that were sometimes being used for personal travel.” As further explained in the article, “[t]he tax code allows businesses to deduct the cost of maintaining a corporate jet as long as it is being used for business purposes. Many companies, however, allow executives, shareholders and partners to use company planes on personal trips while continuing to claim the full value of those deductions.”  

The article goes on to state that “[d]istinguishing between business and personal travel is not always simple, and the IRS could be forced to engage in lengthy litigation” to prove its point.  That’s certainly true in some cases.  But, in my experience, it’s not true in many cases.  At the risk of mixing metaphors by citing SEC literature when the IRS is involved, the SEC has made it pretty clear what is and is not a perquisite – even if it has refused to define the term.  For instance, when the SEC adopted the current rules regarding disclosure of personal benefits, it made the following statements:

  • A benefit (such as aircraft usage) is “not a… personal benefit if it is integrally and directly related to the performance of the executive’s duties”.
  • “[A]n item is a… personal benefit if it confers a direct or indirect benefit that has a personal aspect, without regard to whether it may be provided for some business reason or for the convenience of the company, unless it is generally available on a non-discriminatory basis to all employees.”  
  • The “concept of a benefit that is ‘integrally and directly related’ to job performance is a narrow one” and would not be satisfied by a determination that the benefit would qualify as an “ordinary” or “necessary” expense for tax or other purposes or that the perquisite provides some benefit or convenience to the company, as well as to the executive.  
  • “If an item is not integrally and directly related to the performance of the executive’s duties, the second step of the analysis comes into play. Does the item confer a direct or indirect benefit that has a personal aspect (without regard to whether it may be provided for some business reason or for the convenience of the company)? If so, is it generally available on a non-discriminatory basis to all employees? For example, a company’s provision of helicopter service for an executive to commute to work from home is not integrally and directly related to job performance (although it would benefit the company by getting the executive to work faster), clearly bestows a benefit that has a personal aspect, and is not generally available to all employees on a non-discriminatory basis” (emphasis added). 

If, as seems apparent, the SEC doesn’t view the helicopter example as being a close call, what do you think it would say about an executive claiming that her husband’s travel on the company jet to a conference she is attending in Costa Rica is “integrally and directly related” to the company’s business?  And many other examples would reach similar conclusions.

As suggested above, the SEC’s views may not be persuasive to the IRS.  Among other things, the goals of the two agencies differ.  However, executives who seek to justify use of “the plane” for personal travel would be well advised to avoid testing the issue. 

books-1617327_1280

Once again, it’s time for the annual list of my favorite books of the year gone by.  As usual, the list consists of books that I read last year, not necessarily books that were published last year.  

With one exception, none of the works of fiction I read in 2023 really blew me away.  For me, great fiction is something that takes me to another place – not necessarily a “fun” place – from my daily grind, and while I have selected my five favorite works of fiction for 2023, only one grabbed me that way.  

Also, I’m adding a few additional categories, including Best Audiobooks, Worst Book of the Year, and Most Disappointing Book of the Year.

Here goes, then….

Non-Fiction

  • King, A Life, by Jonathan Eig: Biography strikes me as one of the most challenging things to write; so many biographies turn into hagiography or a total trashing of the subject.  In stark contrast, this biography of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. treats the subject as a man, with failings and strengths like all men.  IMHO, this is a must read for anyone interested in Dr. King and his work.
  • Citizens of London, by Lynne Olson: Ms. Olson’s works excel when she writes about a limited aspect of history; in fact, of the books of hers I’ve read thus far, the ones that don’t succeed try to paint a large canvas.  This book focuses on a few great men who found themselves in London as World War II got underway – Averell Harriman, Edward R. Murrow, and Ambassador John Gilbert Winant (and if you say “John Gilbert who?”, you’re not alone).  Of course, there are many other great men (and quite a few women) who play prominent roles in the events Ms. Olson writes about, but the focus is clearly on those three.  If you are interested in WWII, you should definitely pick this one up.
  • Two Roads Home, by Daniel Finkelstein: A fascinating and eminently readable book about how this British journalist’s parents met, their respective families’ experiences during WWII, and the coincidences that ensued.  
  • Trust the Plan, by Will Sommer: A slim but critical book about QAnon.  It is scary and weird and gripping from start to finish.
  • True Story, by Michael Finkel: Finkel has been much praised for his book The Art Thief, but for my money this one is much more interesting.  It concerns itself with a criminal who posed as the author, who himself was involved in a very well publicized journalism scandal, and their very odd relationship.  

Fiction

  • North Woods, by Daniel Mason: This is the exception I referred to above.  It is a fictional biography of a house in Western Massachusetts over several generations.  First and foremost, Mason’s writing, particularly about the flora and fauna of the area, is splendid.  And while I didn’t find myself sitting at the edge of my seat to find out what happens, there is a story here and it’s very well done.  I’ll also add that I am not a fan of magical realism, but Mason pulls it off very well indeed.
  • The Heaven and Earth Grocery Store, by James McBride: McBride also writes beautifully; in fact, there are some passages that I went back and read a few times for the sheer enjoyment of his prose.  The book was a bit too disjointed and too full of characters for my taste, but everything McBride writes is worth reading, and this is no exception.
  • The Gift of Rain, by Tan Twan Eng: Eng’s three novels all revolve around life in colonial, pre-WWII Malaya, but this one takes us through the war and the hero’s relationship with his sensei and the consequences of that relationship for his role in the war.  The book was a bit too focused on his training and meditation and all that for my taste, but was nonetheless fascinating.
  • The Oppermans, by Lion Feuchtwanger: This book, written in Germany in 1933, concerns itself with an upper class Jewish family that manages to blind itself to what is about to happen.  It is quietly chilling and very well done.
  • Babi Yar, by Anatoly Kusnetsov: The author described this book as a “documentary novel,” which suggests that it might belong in the non-fiction category, but since he called it a novel, I’m not inclined to disagree.  This book is also chilling, particularly when he refers to things like book banning and what it portended for the future in Ukraine in the 1930s.

Best Audiobooks

I’ve taken up listening to audiobooks, though I find I can only listen to works of non-fiction, because there are too many distractions to concentrate on the plot of a mystery or a novel.  My favorites were: 

  • What the Dead Know, written and narrated by Barbara Butcher
  • The Lion House, written by Christopher de Bellaigue and narrated (brilliantly, IMHO) by Barnaby Edwards
  • 1776, written and narrated by David McCullough

Worst Book

Age of Vice, by Deepti Kapoor: The first 100 pages were terrific, but everything after that was a mess.

Most Disappointing Book

The Covenant of Water, by Abraham Verghese: I loved Dr. Verghese’s other books, most particularly Cutting for Stone, but this one was screamingly in need of a good editor.  Characters and plot complications proliferate on every one of its 700+ pages, and the story struck me as pointless.

listening-3079065_1280

I have often said that the SEC is an outstanding agency – for example, see here.  I still believe that, although my belief has been tested in the last couple of years by the “regulatory rampage” in which the SEC has engaged.

But there is always room for improvement, and in a November speech, Commissioner Mark Uyeda offered some significant suggestions that, IMHO, would benefit companies, their stock- and stakeholders, and our capital markets generally.   I urge you to read the speech.  And, more importantly, I urge the SEC to take Commissioner Uyeda’s suggestions seriously.

Here are a few of his key points:

  • Determining the Purpose of Rules:  The first step in rulemaking should be “to answer the question: what problem is the Commission trying to solve?”  Commissioner Uyeda notes that the answer to that question is increasingly that investors desire the information.  In discussions with the SEC staff – particularly in recent years – I’ve heard that a lot.  However, it’s impossible to know whether one or a small number of investors want the information or whether the staff is hearing from lots of investors who want it, and the Commission apparently is not asking why they want it and what use they plan to make of it.  Commissioner Uyeda suggests that the  Commission should inquire into those subjects before running off to adopt rules.  I couldn’t agree more.  All too often, the justification for onerous new rules seems to be that some investors would be interested in the information; I submit that that is not even close to a legitimate basis on which to engage in rulemaking.
  • Re-Proposing Rules:  In the last few years, the SEC has re-proposed a number of rules that were proposed years ago but were not acted upon.  In particular, Commissioner Uyeda refers to the “Pay vs. Performance” rules that were finally adopted in time to impact companies’ proxy statements in 2023.  He notes that certain provisions of the re-proposed rules differed significantly from the originally proposed rules but that the comment period was too short to permit careful consideration of the differences, with the end result that the new rules don’t seem to work in some respects.  His solution is that “[b]efore the Commission adopts any final rule that significantly deviates from the [original] proposal, it should seriously consider re-proposing the rule with the revised rule text and an updated economic analysis.”  Again, I couldn’t agree more.
  • Scalability:  Commissioner Uyeda points out that as far back as 1992, “the Commission recognized that smaller companies ‘are disproportionately affected by…complexities in…disclosure requirements’”, but that many recent rulemakings, including those on cybersecurity, share repurchases, Rule 10b5-1 plans, and clawbacks, do not provide for scaled disclosure.  He also notes that the current classifications of issuers – e.g., “accelerated filers” – don’t really help, pointing out that “an accelerated filer with a $250 million public float [is] subject to the same disclosure requirements as a large accelerated filer with a $250 billion float.”  He doesn’t comment on the impact that unscaled rulemaking has on companies considering going public or public companies contemplating going dark or going private, but I can tell you from personal experience that onerous rules are a big factor in those considerations.
  • Finally, though he doesn’t use the term “regulatory rampage,” Commissioner Uyeda lists the new rules that took effect in 2023 and those that will impact companies’ 2024 disclosures and notes that the cumulative effect of that rampage places incredible pressure on companies (and their counsel), making it very difficult to provide meaningful disclosure: “Given the tight deadlines and resource constraints, it would not be surprising if companies rely more on boilerplate disclosure that provides little or no benefit to investors.”

I would add just one more suggestion, though I can’t take credit for it (those who deserve the credit know who you are).  Specifically, the Commission consults with a variety of groups, such as the Investor Advisory Committee and the Small Business Advisory Committee.  Why not create an “Issuer Advisory Committee” (or something similar) so that, among other things, rulemakings could be discussed and considered – and, ideally, debugged – before they are proposed.  I fervently believe that such a committee could facilitate better rulemaking.  However, I have witnessed several situations in which this suggestion has been dismissed as if it is not even worthy of consideration.  It’s been pointed out that the other advisory committees were mandated by Congress; that may be true, but it’s equally true that the Commission does not need Congressional permission to form such a committee.  

I’m a strong believer in good regulation, and I also believe that suggestions like those above could help to make our public company disclosure regime better.  I hope that someone – aside from Commissioner Uyeda – is listening. 

scale-2635397_640

We’ve all heard the expression “hard cases make bad law.”  But sometimes bad law is the result of bad cases – i.e., cases that should never have been brought in the first place.  That’s the case with the SEC’s prosecution of Ray Dirks, who died on December 9 at age 89.  I suspect that many of you are too young to have heard of Dirks or the prosecution, but the SEC’s vendetta against him is one of the factors that has led to our screwed-up approach to prosecution of insider trading.

The events in question took place in 1973.  Dirks was a well regarded securities analyst working for a major (since defunct) research firm when a former executive of Equity Funding informed him that the company was one massive fraud.  He conducted his own investigation, determined that the information he’d received was accurate, and reported it to the SEC, which ignored him.  (Can you say “Bernie Madoff”?)  He also told The Wall Street Journal what he had learned and advised his clients to sell their holdings of Equity Funding.  They did just that before the information became public.

Turns out he was right.  Equity Funding collapsed, and some of its executives were prosecuted, convicted, and imprisoned.

You’d think that the SEC would have apologized or at least acknowledged that he was right, right?  Wrong!  The SEC censured him for insider trading, among other things, which would have resulted in penalties, including suspension.  Dirks fought back, and in 1983 the US Supreme Court overturned the censure and rejected the SEC’s interpretation of insider trading.  Instead, the Court said that liability for insider trading depends upon whether the source of the information – the tipper – had breached a legal duty to the corporation’s shareholders in passing along the information; that the tipper in this case was motivated by a desire to expose the fraud; and that “there was no derivative breach” by Dirks.

I don’t blame the Court for coming up with this rather convoluted route to Dirks’s exoneration; after all, one of my law school professors used to beat us over the head with the notion that courts will sometimes bend over backwards to fashion a remedy where the strict letter of the law leads to an unjust result.  That seems to me to be a good thing.  Also, I know that I’m in the minority – possibly a very small minority – that believes that the goal of insider trading law should be to create a level playing field rather than to punish breaches of fiduciary duty.  Still, the Dirks case has resulted in decades of confusion over what is – and what is not – insider trading, and I believe that we’d have all been better off if the SEC had not engaged in overzealousness where Dirks was concerned – particularly given the agency’s non-response to the allegations he’d brought to its attention.