Although Dodd-Frank was enacted in 2010, the rule needed to implement one of its provisions – the requirement to disclose hedging policies – only recently took effect. In fact, for calendar-year companies, 2020 will be the first year in which the proxy statement will have
In recent years, the SEC has made a number of incremental changes to make disclosures more effective – not only more meaningful and user-friendly for investors, but also helpful to those of us who prepare disclosures for our companies and clients.
The drive to make disclosures more effective seems to have kicked into a higher gear with the August 8 issuance of a proposal that may result in the most significant changes in the disclosure rules in more than 30 years. The proposal would modify some key provisions of Regulation S-K, and in doing so would move considerably closer to a principles-based approach to disclosure. Some details follow.…
I recently came across an article reporting that the interim president of a state university system had failed to report a number of corporate board seats on his ethics forms. That got me thinking about the forms he may have been asked to complete, which in turn got me thinking about D&O questionnaires.
Getting directors and officers to accurately complete and return questionnaires in a timely manner is one of the most frustrating tasks faced by corporate secretaries. Years ago, I was speaking at a program for aspiring corporate governance nerds, when a young aspirant asked me if I had the secret to getting this task done. If memory serves me correctly, my response was to the effect that if I had the answer to her question, I could retire.
However, I sometimes think that people who circulate questionnaires are their own worst enemies. For example, a recent study reported that D&O questionnaires averaged 40 pages and 65 questions. That means that some, perhaps many, questionnaires are far longer. It’s unrealistic to expect someone with a life – much less a day job – to devote the amount of time necessary to complete a 40-page (or longer) questionnaire, particularly when many questions don’t lend themselves to simple “yes” or “no” answers.…
As our readers know, I am irritated by Congress’s penchant for naming bills so as to create nifty acronyms. And for including provisions that have nothing to do with the name or the acronym. However, I can better put up with these irritants when the legislation – and SEC regulations implementing the legislation – create a good result.
Such is the case with the FAST Act. It stands for “Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act,” and despite its acronymic name and its questionable connection to securities law, it contained some provisions to make disclosures more effective and the process by which disclosures are made somewhat easier.
SEC Rule 701 exempts non-reporting companies from registering securities offered or sold to employees, officers, directors, partners, trustees, consultants, and advisors under compensatory benefit plans or other compensation agreements. As discussed in an earlier post, under the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act (EGRRCPA) passed by Congress in 2018, the threshold for the aggregate sales price of securities sold during any consecutive 12-month period that triggers additional disclosure requirements under Rule 701 was increased from $5 million to $10 million. What may have gone unnoticed was that the SEC has adopted final rules to implement EGRRCPA and has published a concept release “soliciting comment on possible ways to modernize rules related to compensatory arrangements in light of the significant evolution in both the types of compensatory offerings and the composition of the workforce since the Commission last substantively amended these rules in 1999.”
As securities lawyers know, disclosure is generally regarded as the best disinfectant. However, in a recent enforcement action, the SEC determined that disclosure is not always enough. Specifically, when it comes to internal controls over financial reporting, or ICFR, companies need to actually fix the problems they disclose.
In the action, the SEC cited…
On December 19, 2018, the SEC adopted final rules allowing reporting companies to rely on the Regulation A exemption.
How did we get here?
The SEC adopted a new – and greatly improved – Regulation A, known as Reg A+, in 2015. As noted in previous posts (see here and here) Reg A, provides an exemption from registration under the Securities Act for smaller public offerings, but for many years was seldom used due to cost restraints and small financing caps. The 2015 amendments, adopted in response to the JOBS Act, remedied these shortcomings, updating Reg A to make it a more viable capital-raising tool.
The main benefits of Reg A+ include the following:
- Companies can raise up to $50 million every 12 months via two overlapping tiers.
- Tier 1: offerings of up to $20 million in a 12-month period.
- Tier 2: offerings of up to $50 million in a 12-month period.
- Insiders can sell their shares in a Reg A+ offering.
- Investors in a Reg A+ offering have immediate liquidity – they can sell their shares once the offering is completed and don’t have to hold them for a period of time.
- Some Reg A+ offerings are exempt from state securities or “blue sky” laws.
- Some Reg A+ offerings are easier to list on an exchange.
- Reg A+ can be used for merger and acquisition transactions.
Following a tweet from the President last August, the SEC has begun the process of reviewing the existing quarterly reporting regime and will be further exploring possible changes that may ease administrative and other burdens on public companies. Specifically, the President “asked the SEC to study!” whether less frequent reporting for publicly traded companies would “allow greater flexibility and save money.” This is not a new issue on the SEC’s radar screen, but it has recently regained traction– the SEC issued a concept release in 2016 soliciting public comments more specifically on reporting frequency and the current quarterly reporting process.
The request for comments, which can be viewed here, asks for public input on several questions related to the existing reporting regime. One of the more interesting questions on which the SEC is seeking input is whether the practice of public companies issuing forward earnings guidance places undue pressure and focus on short-term results and negatively impacts long-term results. Several commentators have expressed concern on this issue over the years and believe management teams with a longer-term view would be better stewards of investor capital. Many of the other specific questions asked by the SEC in its request for comments relate directly to the current reporting process and whether changes could be made that balance the interests of investors while making the reporting process more efficient, including, among other things:…
The SEC recently settled charges against two prominent celebrities in connection with the promotion of initial coin offerings. Boxer Floyd Mayweather Jr. and music producer and social media star DJ Khaled were charged in separate incidents with failing to disclose that they had received payments for promoting ICOs. While the SEC has provided prior guidance…
No, this is not a riff on Hamlet’s soliloquy. It’s about the current kerfuffle (one of my favorite words) about stock buybacks. In case you’ve not heard, some (but not all) of the concerns about stock buybacks are as follows:
- Plowing all that cash into buying back stock means that it’s not going into plant and equipment, R&D or other things that facilitate longer-term growth and job creation.
- Companies are using the windfall from the 2017 tax act to buy shares back rather than to make investments that will create jobs and longer-term growth.
- Stock buybacks artificially inflate stock prices and earnings per share, which contributes to or results in additional (i.e., excessive) executive compensation.
- By reducing the number of shares outstanding, buybacks mask the dilutive effects of equity grants to senior management.
And now there’s another concern. Specifically, in a recent speech, new SEC Commissioner Jackson announced that stock buybacks are being used by executives to dispose of the shares they receive in the equity grants referred to above. And one of his proposed solutions is that compensation committees engage in more active oversight – or, rather, that compensation committees should be required to engage in more active oversight – of insider trades “linked” to buybacks.