Gustav L. Schmidt

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New social disclosures are designed to make issuers tattletalesIn other breaking news that many may have missed, Orbitz Worldwide, Inc. recently reported in its most recent 10-Q that a handful of employees of a Hilton-branded hotel were paid wages via direct deposit into bank accounts maintained with Bank Melli. The obvious question is why is Orbitz reporting on seemingly immaterial activities of a third party private hotel company in its public filings? The answer is because the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (ITRA) now requires it. 

The ITRA recently added new Iran-related disclosure requirements for public reporting companies under new Section 13(r) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which became effective for SEC periodic reports due on or after February 6, 2013. Among other things, public companies are required to disclose in their periodic reports whether they knowingly engaged in (or any of their affiliates knowingly engaged in) certain “Iran-related activities, ” which generally include dealings involving: 

  • the Iranian government;
  • entities owned or controlled by the Iranian government;
  • persons designated on the OFAC Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list as representatives of the Iranian government;
  • persons and entities identified on the SDN list as supporters of terrorism or proliferators of weapons of mass destruction;
  • financial institutions that facilitated a transaction for any person or on the SDN list whose property is blocked in connection with certain terrorist-related activities; or
  • Iranian oil resources. 

At first glance, many reporting companies may believe that the new requirements of Section 13(r) would be inapplicable to their business and operations. However, a significant number of public companies are taking a conservative approach with their Iran-related disclosures and are reporting almost anything that is potentially covered by the ITRA. The reason for this conservatism is likely due to two key aspects of the ITRA requirements. 

First, Section 13(r) requires reporting of activity of both the issuer and its affiliates. The term “affiliate” is
Continue Reading Are new Iran-related disclosure requirements turning public companies into tattletales?

Director Pay Practices

Since 2007, executive compensation practices of public companies have been at the forefront of activist shareholders’ and shareholder rights groups’ agendas. Mandatory say-on-pay proposals, enhanced executive compensation disclosure, compensation committee and compensation consultant independence rules are just a few of the recent significant changes to the laws and regulations applicable to public companies in the U.S. Moreover, as we reported in prior blogs, some countries have gone as far as making say-on-pay proposals binding on public companies. In fact, just this year, Switzerland amended its constitution to require binding shareholder say-on-pay votes and other executive compensation limitations for its public companies (also check out Broc Romanek’s blog for a collection of articles related to this topic). However, while public company executives have been in the crosshairs, little attention, if any, has been given to compensation of public company directors.

But that may change as a result of certain director pay practices highlighted by a recent NY Times Deal Book article by Steven Davidoff. The article focuses on two current proxy fights involving hedge funds attempting to get their proposed nominees elected to the boards of Hess Corporation and Agrium Inc. In the first case, the nominating hedge fund is proposing to pay a $30,000 bonus to any of its nominees who ultimately win a seat on the Hess board. Additionally, each such nominee would be eligible to earn a performance bonus based on share performance relative to its peer group. Based on the performance award formula, the maximum potential payout could be as much as $9 million if Hess outperforms its peer group by 300% over a three-year measuring period.

The second case is potentially even more lucrative for the director nominees. In addition to a $50,000 bonus each nominee would receive if elected,  they would also receive 2.6% of Jana Partners’ net profit based on the stock closing price on September 27, 2012. Director nominees not elected would still receive 1.8% of the net profit during that same period. Considering Jana’s total investment in Agrium is over $1 billion, the earning potential could be significant. However, based on the results of the Agrium annual meeting held on April 9, it appears that none of these Jana nominees were elected to the Agrium board this time around.

These arrangements pose some interesting questions from a corporate governance standpoint. Historically, directors
Continue Reading Will director compensation be the next target?

Say-on-pay lawsuitsWhy doesn’t the plaintiffs’ bar believe Congress means what it says? The Dodd-Frank Act could not have been more clear that the outcome of the mandatory say-on-pay advisory vote for public companies does not create or imply any change to the fiduciary duties of board members. However, as we have discussed in previous blog posts, this fact hasn’t stopped lawsuits in the wake of failed say-on-pay votes that allege, among other things, breaches of fiduciary duty by the boards of directors and management of public companies related to such failed votes. The vast majority of these cases have been dismissed at the early stages of proceedings, usually for failing to make a proper demand on the board of directors as required by most state corporate law statutes, but this has only lead to a shift in strategies. 

As the old saying goes, if you fail, try and try again. That is exactly what the plaintiffs’ bar is doing. The current tactic du jour seems to involve filing suits to enjoin the annual meeting. Most of these complaints seeking an injunction have typically alleged that directors and/or management breached their respective fiduciary duties by not providing adequate disclosure in the annual proxy statement to enable shareholders to make informed voting decisions, usually as it relates to proposals seeking to approve (i) executive compensation, (ii) a new or amended compensation plan, or (iii) an amendment to the charter to increase the number of authorize shares. Some of the most common allegations include: 

  • “The Proxy fails to disclose the fair summary of any expert’s analysis or any opinion obtain[ed] in connection with the [equity incentive plan]”; 
  • “The Proxy fails to disclose the criteria” used by the compensation committee “to implement the [stock purchase plan] and why the [equity incentive plan] would be in the best interest of shareholders”; 
  • “The Proxy fails to disclose the dilutive impact that issuing additional shares may have on existing shareholders”; and 
  • “The Proxy fails to disclose how the Board determined the number of additional shares requested to be authorized.” 

The timing of these lawsuits is less than ideal for companies as many are only a few weeks away from their scheduled meeting. This, of course, creates increased pressure to
Continue Reading Say-on-pay litigation: Round 2

Is ISS claiming pledging is the same as bribery?The answer: when ISS is evaluating a public company’s corporate governance under its revised policies for the 2013 proxy season. We previously blogged about the potential insider trading issues that could theoretically arise when insiders pledge company stock to secure loans. Now, with the implementation of the revised ISS governance standards, there are additional reasons for publicly traded companies to implement antipledging and antihedging policies.

ISS specifically addressed hedging and pledging activity in its 2013 U.S. corporate governance policy updates, which were posted in November of last year.  In these updates, ISS included a footnote to its policy on voting for director nominees in uncontested elections in circumstances where there are perceived corporate governance failures. Under the new policy, ISS will recommend “against” or “withhold” votes for directors (individually, committee members, or, in extreme cases, the entire board) due to “[m]aterial failures of governance, stewardship, risk oversight, or fiduciary responsibilities at the company”. The new footnote cites hedging and significant pledging of company stock as examples of activities that will be considered failures of risk oversight. Other cited examples of risk oversight failures include bribery, large or serial fines or sanctions from regulatory bodies, and significant adverse legal judgments or settlements. 

The rationale behind this new update seems to be based on ISS’s belief that pledging any amount of company stock by insiders for a loan is
Continue Reading When does hedging or pledging of company stock by insiders equate to bribery?

Campaign diclosure rules to create administrative nighmareAs first reported by Professors  Lucian Bebchuk and Robert J. Jackson, Jr. in their recent posting on the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, the SEC may take action to issue proposed rules on corporate political spending disclosures by public companies as early as the second quarter of this year. This is according to the most recently updated Current Unified Agenda and Regulatory Plan, where the SEC appears to have preliminarily scheduled a notice of proposed rulemaking on this subject for April. Realistically, the fact that these rules are scheduled on this regulatory agenda is probably not very significant and may have gotten there as a means to temporarily appease shareholder rights advocates that have recently been pressing for these disclosures. Additionally, considering that the current four-person commission is equally divided on the political front, it is not likely that anything significant will come out of the SEC in the near future until a replacement for Mary Schapiro is appointed and confirmed. 

If something does miraculously materialize, it would be an interesting move by the SEC considering that rules required to be adopted under the Dodd-Frank Act have yet to be fully implemented almost three years after the bill was signed into law in 2010. This fact was emphasized in Commissioner Gallagher’s recent comments to the U.S. Chamber Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness. In those comments, Commissioner Gallagher specifically noted that “the SEC, like other regulators, is now dealing with the problem of rushed, inadequate rule proposals that were pushed out in a bid to meet arbitrary congressional deadlines.”  With the backlog of Dodd-Frank and JOBS Act rules, why would the SEC even bat an eyelash at a rules proposal with no Congressional mandate? 

In any case, there’s no question that campaign contribution disclosure has been a hot topic, particularly in the wake
Continue Reading Proposed campaign contribution disclosure rules may be coming as early as April (but not likely)

General Solicitation and Stock SalesFor securities issuers, the most widely used exemption from registration is the private offering exemption in Section 4 of the Securities Act. Formerly referred to as the “Section 4(2)” exemption, the enactment of the JOBS Act in April of this year fixed the section numbering in Section 4 of the Securities Act which, until now, had not conformed to the alternating number-letter-number format contained in the other sections of that Act. Thus, the old 4(2) private offering exemption is now the Section 4(a)(2) exemption, although many issuers and practitioners have failed to realize this administrative change as evidenced by recent Form 8-K filings pursuant to Item 3.02 which still make reference to the “Section 4(2)” private offering exemption as the applicable exemption relied upon for their respective unregistered securities offerings.

But aside from this administrative fix, has the JOBS Act actually changed the exemption requirements itself? Arguably it has as I will hypothesize in this post.

Most securities professionals are aware that the JOBS Act requires the SEC to amend Rule 506 to permit general solicitation and advertising in connection with a private offering in which all purchasers are “accredited investors.” Many people mistakenly refer to Rule 506 as an “exemption” but it is not actually an exemption per se. Rather, the SEC adopted Rule 506 to provide a safe harbor to give definitive guidance to issuers who undertook private placements of their securities under then-Section 4(2) (now Section 4(a)(2)) as to what criteria must be satisfied to provide certainty to the issuer that their offering complied with the private offering exemption. Simply put, if you meet the requirements of Rule 506, then the offering is exempt pursuant to Section 4(a)(2).

Prior to the adoption of Rule 506 which established definitive criteria for compliance with the private offering exemption, the 4(a)(2) exemption standards were developed through case law over the years. The famous Ralston Purina case and its progeny focused on three primary factors to consider in determining whether the private offering exemption applied based on
Continue Reading Did the JOBS Act unintentionally change the statutory private offering exemption?

Campaign contribution disclosure rulesPetition and comment letters urging the SEC to create rules requiring public companies to disclose their political contributions may finally be gaining some traction.  We previously blogged about this petition, which was submitted by a group of ten law professors in response to the Supreme Court’s opinion in the Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission case, asking the SEC to consider adopting rules that would require public companies to make disclosures about their political contributions. We also blogged about SEC Commissioner Luis Aguilar’s subsequent comments during a speech stating that the SEC should consider rules requiring this type of disclosure. Until recently, the SEC had not taken any action to consider issuing rules in this area. 

However, according to a Wall Street Journal report from November 8th, the SEC’s Division of Corporate Finance is now considering recommending that the agency’s commissioners propose rules mandating public companies to provide disclosure to shareholders regarding the uses of corporate resources for political purposes. Such rules, of course, would not be inconsistent with the recent trend toward mandating social disclosures in public company filings, like the conflict mineral rules which were recently adopted in August of this year. Although many have argued that these types of social disclosure rules
Continue Reading Are political contribution disclosure rules for public companies coming in the near future?

Dual track acquistion structureWhen the private equity firm 3G Capital took Burger King private in 2010, it used an innovative “dual-track” acquisition structure to minimize the amount of time to consummate the acquisition. This involved 3G simultaneously pursuing both a friendly tender offer to Burger King shareholders as well as a traditional merger that would need to be approved by shareholders at a special meeting. Since the Burger King deal, nearly 20 other companies have used this structure. 

In basic terms, a tender offer allows the acquirer to make a direct offer to shareholders to purchase shares of the target company at a specified price. Consummation of the tender offer is usually contingent upon the target shareholders tendering a minimum number of shares so that the acquirer can take advantage of a subsequent short-form merger to squeeze out any non-tendering shareholders thereby resulting in the acquirer being the 100% shareholder of the target company. On the other hand, a traditional merger involves the solicitation of shareholder votes to approve the acquisition by proxy or in person at a special shareholder meeting. 

From a timing perspective, acquirers typically prefer to use tender offers to accomplish acquisitions because it normal takes less time to complete because, among other things, it does not require a special meeting of the shareholders to approve the transaction. Where a traditional merger can take upwards of three to six months to complete (depending on the circumstances), a tender offer can be completed in as few as 20 business days following the date the tender offer is initiated (the minimum period that a tender offer must remain open). However, if shareholders of a target company do not tender the minimum number of shares necessary to consummate the acquisition, the acquirer would be forced to abandon the tender offer and switch over to a traditional merger structure. 

In the Burger King deal, rather than waiting to see whether the tender offer was successful, 3G simultaneously prepared documents and made filings to proceed with a traditional merger concurrently with the tender offer. By doing this, 3G would have a head start on the traditional merger transaction if the tender offer ultimately failed, thereby saving significant time. However, public companies considering this type of approach should be aware that the timing of certain key events when undertaking a dual-track approach could result in an inadvertent violation of the Exchange Act rules. 

Specifically, Rule 14e-5 issued under the Exchange Act prohibits an acquirer from
Continue Reading Acquirers beware! New expedited acquisition method could violate the Exchange Act

Photo by Giandomenico Ricci

On September 12, 2012, Apple, Inc. held a highly anticipated conference at which it announced the upcoming release of the latest model of the iPhone. These types of conferences have been part of Apple’s standard operations for many years and seem to be a key element of its marketing strategy. Although attendance is limited to select persons, many Apple enthusiasts are able to keep up-to-date on an almost real-time basis by following any one of the numerous live blogs that usually cover the events. However, the manner in which these conferences are conducted, notably some of the information disclosed during the presentations, may inadvertently run afoul of Regulation FD. 

Regulation FD (Fair Disclosure) is an issuer disclosure rule that addresses selective disclosure. The regulation provides that when an issuer, or person acting on its behalf, discloses material nonpublic information to certain enumerated persons (in general, securities market professionals and holders of the issuer’s securities who may well trade on the basis of the information), it must make public disclosure of that information. The timing of the required public disclosure depends on whether the selective disclosure was intentional or non-intentional; for an intentional selective disclosure, the issuer must make public disclosure simultaneously; for a non-intentional disclosure, the issuer must make public disclosure promptly. Under the regulation, the required public disclosure may be made by filing or furnishing a Form 8-K, or by another method or combination of methods that is reasonably designed to effect broad, non-exclusionary distribution of the information to the public. 

As mentioned above, Regulation FD applies to disclosures of “material nonpublic” information about the issuer or its securities. The regulation does not define the terms “material” and “nonpublic,” but relies on existing definitions of these terms established in the case law. Generally speaking, information is material if “there is a substantial
Continue Reading Did Apple violate Regulation FD at its iPhone 5 release conference?

Following up on my post on the subject, I had the opportunity to speak with Colin O’Keefe of LXBN regarding the Facebook/Instagram deal.  In the brief interview, I explain how things have changed since Facebook’s IPO and what, if anything, that meant for the deal’s fairness review with the California Department of Corporations.