I don’t know very much about the federal budget process, but I do know that any budget proposed by the White House – regardless of its occupant – isn’t worth spending time on, and that by the time the budget is passed, it often looks
Earlier this month, after seven years of threats, the PCAOB adopted rules to drastically change the standard auditor’s report. In adopting the rules, the PCAOB noted that the standard auditor’s report had largely remained unchanged since the 1940s. I believe there was good reason for this: the current auditor’s report works well (or at least well enough). It is simple and, therefore, easy to interpret. Either a company receives an unqualified opinion or it doesn’t. The current report is generally referred to as a pass/fail model. But, the simple and straightforward approach is about to change.
Enter the CAMs
The PCAOB has introduced a new acronym for us to learn, CAM, which stands for Critical Audit Matter. Under the new rules, a CAM is any matter communicated or required to be communicated to the audit committee that: (i) relates to material accounts or disclosures that are material to the financial statements and (ii) involves especially challenging, subjective, or complex auditor judgment. Each and every CAM, as determined by an issuer’s auditor, will then be identified and described in the audit report and the auditor will explain how the CAMs were addressed in the audit. Simple enough, right? Don’t worry, if you are confused – the rules contain a flow chart!
The whole idea behind the CAMs concept is that it is designed to reduce the information asymmetry that exists between investors and auditors. The PCAOB is concerned that investors are unable to adequately assess the risk that underlies the estimates and judgments made by management in preparing the financial statements. That’s probably a fair assessment, but changing the auditor’s report won’t address information asymmetry. And here’s why:
First, critical audit matters are already identified in the MD&A and the financial statements. The PCAOB claims that the auditor should not be limited to discussing the estimates that management discloses. While that may be a good point, most sophisticated users of financial statements should be able to identify the significant estimates an issuer would make. Generally, these estimates are consistent from company to company based on their industry. Is it a revelation that a commercial bank’s most significant estimate is its allowance for loan losses? Or that the valuation of inventory would be important to an issuer with a large inventory balance (especially if the inventory can quickly become obsolete)?
Second, the PCAOB notes that if there aren’t any identified CAMs then the auditor will need to state that fact. What’s the likelihood that any of the larger accounting firms will go on record to state that there was very little judgment used in compiling a set of financial statements? I think the likelihood is next to zero. Also, what is the likelihood that each auditor will craft a custom disclosure each year
Continue Reading The CAMs are coming and other enlightened enhancements courtesy of the PCAOB
In recent years, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) and federal regulators of the financial services industry have more aggressively enforced the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) and the economic sanctions imposed by the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”). While this should in of itself be a matter of particular attention to the directors and officers of those entities in the financial services industry, so too should the recent trend toward increased scrutiny for directors and officers failing to address alleged BSA or OFAC compliance shortfalls. An August 2014 agreement reached by FinCEN and a former casino official permanently barring the official from working in any financial institution drives the point home: When it comes to liability for BSA or OFAC violations, FinCEN and federal regulators might not limit penalties to the entity actually committing violations, and instead, may also penalize the individual directors and officers of those entities.
Even before FinCEN’s August 2014 bar of the casino official, a number of enforcement actions assessed personal monetary penalties against financial institution directors and officers over the past few years. In February 2009, the directors of Sykesville Federal Savings Association were collectively fined
Continue Reading Directors and Officers Beware: You could be individually liable for your entity’s Bank Secrecy Act or Office of Foreign Assets Control violations
The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (“FATCA”) is a US law designed to counter offshore tax avoidance by US persons. Controversial because of its wide-ranging breadth and application to non-US financial institutions, in the most general sense, FATCA imposes a 30% withholding tax on payments of US source income made to foreign financial institutions (“FFIs”) unless they enter into an agreement with the US Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) and disclose information about their US account holders.
After having revised the timelines for FATCA’s implementation on several occasions (culminating in an implementation delay of over three years from the date of its adoption in March of 2010), FATCA’s official July 1, 2014 implementation date is on the horizon. As a result, FFIs worldwide have made a mad dash in the race toward FATCA compliance over the last few months.
So why does this matter to non-banking/non-financial institutions? Well, as an initial matter, FATCA’s definition of an FFI is broad, including more types of entities than one might expect. As a result, US entities must make sure they have evaluated their corporate structure to determine whether its network includes an FFI. Under FATCA rules, the following types of entities may qualify as FFIs, subject to certain exceptions:
Additionally, even if an organization’s affiliate network does not include an FFI, US-based entities could be
Continue Reading FATCA: What it is, and why it may apply to your business
The PCAOB’s recently proposed auditing standards aim to “provide investors and other financial statement users with potentially valuable information that investors have expressed interest in receiving but have not had access to in the past” by changing the standard auditor’s report and increasing the auditor’s responsibilities. Sounds like a lofty goal, except that the information that they are proposing to require auditors to provide is either (i) self-evident; (ii) an infringement on the judgment of the issuer’s audit committee; or (iii) just plain not helpful. What the proposed auditing standards do accomplish, however, is to add more costs to being a public company just like their last proposal on mandatory auditor rotation.
Critical Audit Matters. Under the proposed auditing standards, an auditor will be required to include a discussion in its auditor’s report about the issuer’s “critical audit matters.” Difficult, subjective, or complex judgments, items that posed the most difficulty in obtaining sufficient evidence, and items that posed the most difficulty in forming the opinion on the financial statements are deemed to be “critical audit matters.” While this requirement may seem straightforward at first, the reality is that this “new” information should be self-evident by anyone who knows how to read a financial statement. Revenue recognition, estimates for allowances, pension assumptions, etc. are typically deemed to be “critical audit matters” by an auditor when planning audit procedures. These critical accounting policies are already discussed in issuers’ MD&A and in their financial statements. Further, any investor who actually is looking at the fundamentals of an issuer’s business and historical results should already be highly focused on estimates that, if wrong, could materially impact the financial statements. Auditors will end up being overly inclusive on what is deemed “critical” for fear of having
Continue Reading PCAOB proposal piling on more costs for public companies (again)