Dual track acquistion structureWhen the private equity firm 3G Capital took Burger King private in 2010, it used an innovative “dual-track” acquisition structure to minimize the amount of time to consummate the acquisition. This involved 3G simultaneously pursuing both a friendly tender offer to Burger King shareholders as well as a traditional merger that would need to be approved by shareholders at a special meeting. Since the Burger King deal, nearly 20 other companies have used this structure. 

In basic terms, a tender offer allows the acquirer to make a direct offer to shareholders to purchase shares of the target company at a specified price. Consummation of the tender offer is usually contingent upon the target shareholders tendering a minimum number of shares so that the acquirer can take advantage of a subsequent short-form merger to squeeze out any non-tendering shareholders thereby resulting in the acquirer being the 100% shareholder of the target company. On the other hand, a traditional merger involves the solicitation of shareholder votes to approve the acquisition by proxy or in person at a special shareholder meeting. 

From a timing perspective, acquirers typically prefer to use tender offers to accomplish acquisitions because it normal takes less time to complete because, among other things, it does not require a special meeting of the shareholders to approve the transaction. Where a traditional merger can take upwards of three to six months to complete (depending on the circumstances), a tender offer can be completed in as few as 20 business days following the date the tender offer is initiated (the minimum period that a tender offer must remain open). However, if shareholders of a target company do not tender the minimum number of shares necessary to consummate the acquisition, the acquirer would be forced to abandon the tender offer and switch over to a traditional merger structure. 

In the Burger King deal, rather than waiting to see whether the tender offer was successful, 3G simultaneously prepared documents and made filings to proceed with a traditional merger concurrently with the tender offer. By doing this, 3G would have a head start on the traditional merger transaction if the tender offer ultimately failed, thereby saving significant time. However, public companies considering this type of approach should be aware that the timing of certain key events when undertaking a dual-track approach could result in an inadvertent violation of the Exchange Act rules. 

Specifically, Rule 14e-5 issued under the Exchange Act prohibits an acquirer from
Continue Reading Acquirers beware! New expedited acquisition method could violate the Exchange Act

Following up on my post on the subject, I had the opportunity to speak with Colin O’Keefe of LXBN regarding the Facebook/Instagram deal.  In the brief interview, I explain how things have changed since Facebook’s IPO and what, if anything, that meant for the deal’s fairness review with the California Department of Corporations.

Following up on my post on the subject, I had the opportunity to speak with Colin O’Keefe of LXBN regarding the Facebook/Instagram deal.  In the brief interview, I explain how things have changed since Facebook’s IPO and what, if anything, that meant for the deal’s fairness review with the California Department of Corporations.

California Department of Corporations, One Sansome Street, San Francisco

We previously blogged about the potential liability for Facebook, Inc. directors if the company paid too much for the social media start-up company Instagram. Recall that in April, Facebook agreed to acquire Instagram for, at the time, approximately $1 billion with the consideration payable 30% in cash and 70% in Facebook common stock (now, due to the decrease in Facebook’s share price from the stipulated price of $30 per share, the deal is only worth about $650 million). A recent NY Times Deal Book article points out that if the deal fixed the total purchase price rather than the number of shares to be issued, Instagram would have gotten a much better deal due to the depressed Facebook share price. Given the declining share price of Facebook stock, is Facebook’s reduced consideration still fair to Instagram’s shareholders? This is exactly the question that will be determined by the California Department of Corporations which will be conducting a fairness review of the acquisition this Wednesday.

The purpose of this fairness hearing is to allow Facebook to take advantage of a lesser-known exemption from registration under the Securities Act of 1933 known as the “3(a)(10) exemption.” Because Facebook is issuing securities in connection with the Instagram acquisition, the 23 million shares to be issued are required to either be registered or they must be exempt from the registration requirements of the Securities Act. The 3(a)(10) exemption allows companies to issue securities in an exchange transaction without registration provided that either a court or designated state agency finds that the transaction is fair to the recipients of the new securities. This exemption was popular during the tech boom and has both advantages and disadvantages when compared with the most common exemption provided by Rule 506 of Regulation D promulgated under the Securities Act. 

Most smaller companies tend to offer and sell securities on an exempt basis because of the substantial costs of conducting a registered offering. There are a laundry list of exemptions but only a few are of much practical use. Most exempt offerings are structured to take advantage
Continue Reading Is Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram fair to Instagram shareholders?