Disclosure Guidance

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Is the SEC making a wrong turn by regulating corporate governance?
Photo by doncarlo

In the wake of the recent financial crisis, the Dodd-Frank Act created the SEC Investor Advisory Committee with the stated purpose of advising the SEC on (i) regulatory priorities of the SEC; (ii) issues relating to the regulation of securities products, trading strategies, and fee structures, and the effectiveness of disclosure; (iii) initiatives to protect investor interest; and (iv) initiatives to promote investor confidence and the integrity of the securities marketplace. In other words, the committee is to advise on matters historically within the purview of federal securities laws. While this is fine and good, there is some indication that the SEC may again be considering the use of disclosure rules to indirectly regulate matters that are not federal securities law matters (see, e.g., conflict mineral rules, Iran-related disclosure rules, CEO pay ratio disclosure rules, etc.).

The new potential area of regulation for the SEC may be internal corporate affairs. The committee’s agenda for the October 9, 2014 meeting of the SEC Investor Advisory Committee will include a discussion of
Continue Reading Wrong turn?: Is the SEC looking to further expand its regulatory jurisdiction through the disclosure process?

How Congo Became a Corporate Governance IssueA few months ago, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld portions of Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, known as the “conflicts mineral rule.” The rule, enacted by Congress in July of 2010,requires certain public companies to provide disclosures about the use of specific conflict minerals supplied by the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and nine neighboring countries. In the D.C. Circuit case, the National Association of Manufacturers, or NAM, challenged the SECs final rule implementing the conflicts mineral rule, raising Administrative Procedure Act, Exchange Act, and First Amendment claims. The D.C. Circuit agreed with NAM on its third claim and held that the final rule violates the First Amendment to the extent the rule requires regulated companies to report to the SEC and to post on their publically available websites information on any of their products that have not been found to be “DRC conflict free.” Despite this adverse ruling, the SEC made it clear that the conflicts minerals rule is here to stay: in a statement on the effect of the D.C. Circuit’s decision, the SEC communicated its expectation that public companies continue to comply with those deadlines and substantive requirements of the rule that the D.C. Circuit’s decision did not affect. So, what is the conflicts mineral rule, how far does it reach, and what are public companies doing to comply?

In an unusual attempt to curtail human rights abuses in Africa through regulation of U.S. public companies, the conflicts mineral rule requires companies to trace the origins of gold, tantalum, tin, and tungsten used in manufacturing and to
Continue Reading Despite First Amendment concerns, the conflict minerals rule is here to stay

Golden leashes
Photo by Don Urban

The compensation disclosure rules contained in Regulation S-K are intended to provide meaningful disclosure regarding an issuer’s executive and director compensation practices such that the investing public is provided with full and fair disclosure of material information on which to base informed investment and voting decisions. However, as we pointed out in a blog from last year, not all compensation is covered by these rules, including compensation paid to directors by third parties (e.g., by a private fund or activist investors). These arrangements are commonly known as “golden leashes.”  The two examples I discussed previously related to proxy fights involving Hess Corporation and Agrium, Inc. In each case, hedge funds had proposed to pay bonuses to the director nominees if they were ultimately elected to the board of directors in their respective proxy contests. Additionally, in the Agrium, Inc. case, the director nominees would have received 2.6% of the hedge fund’s net profit based on the increase in the issuer’s stock price from a prior measurement date. The amounts at issue could have been significant considering this particular hedge fund’s investment in Agrium, Inc. exceeded $1 billion, but none of the nominees were ultimately elected to the Agrium, Inc. board.

Considering the large personal gains these director nominees could potentially realize under these types of arrangements, it could pose a problem from a corporate governance standpoint as it is a long-standing principal of corporate law that directors are not permitted to use their position of trust and confidence to further their private interests. Recognizing this potential problem, the Council of Institutional Investors (“CII”), a nonprofit association of pension funds, other employee benefit funds, endowments and foundations with combined assets that exceed $3 trillion, recently wrote the SEC asking for a review of existing proxy rules “for ways to ensure complete information is provided to investors about such arrangements.”

In its letter, the CII points out that existing disclosure rules do not “specifically require disclosure of compensatory arrangements between a board nominee and the group that nominated such nominee.” The CII believes that disclosure related to these types of third party director compensation arrangements are material to investors due to the potential
Continue Reading Institutional investor organization asks the SEC to require disclosure of “golden leashes”

Golden leashes
Photo by Don Urban

The compensation disclosure rules contained in Regulation S-K are intended to provide meaningful disclosure regarding an issuer’s executive and director compensation practices such that the investing public is provided with full and fair disclosure of material information on which to base informed investment and voting decisions. However, as we pointed out in a blog from last year, not all compensation is covered by these rules, including compensation paid to directors by third parties (e.g., by a private fund or activist investors). These arrangements are commonly known as “golden leashes.”  The two examples I discussed previously related to proxy fights involving Hess Corporation and Agrium, Inc. In each case, hedge funds had proposed to pay bonuses to the director nominees if they were ultimately elected to the board of directors in their respective proxy contests. Additionally, in the Agrium, Inc. case, the director nominees would have received 2.6% of the hedge fund’s net profit based on the increase in the issuer’s stock price from a prior measurement date. The amounts at issue could have been significant considering this particular hedge fund’s investment in Agrium, Inc. exceeded $1 billion, but none of the nominees were ultimately elected to the Agrium, Inc. board.

Considering the large personal gains these director nominees could potentially realize under these types of arrangements, it could pose a problem from a corporate governance standpoint as it is a long-standing principal of corporate law that directors are not permitted to use their position of trust and confidence to further their private interests. Recognizing this potential problem, the Council of Institutional Investors (“CII”), a nonprofit association of pension funds, other employee benefit funds, endowments and foundations with combined assets that exceed $3 trillion, recently wrote the SEC asking for a review of existing proxy rules “for ways to ensure complete information is provided to investors about such arrangements.”

In its letter, the CII points out that existing disclosure rules do not “specifically require disclosure of compensatory arrangements between a board nominee and the group that nominated such nominee.” The CII believes that disclosure related to these types of third party director compensation arrangements are material to investors due to the potential
Continue Reading Institutional investor organization asks the SEC to require disclosure of "golden leashes"

Section 108 of the Jump Start Our Business Startups Actrequired the

Study states more studies required - similar to a punt?
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SEC to undertake a study of the disclosure requirements of Regulation S-K. Specifically, the statute mandated that the SEC shall:

conduct a review of its Regulation S-K to—

  1. comprehensively analyze the current registration requirements of such regulation; and
  2. determine how such requirements can be updated to modernize and simplify the registration process and reduce the costs and other burdens associated with these requirements for issuers who are emerging growth companies.

In addition, the JOBS Act required that the SEC report to Congress its specific recommendations on how to streamline the registration process in order to make it more efficient and less burdensome for prospective issuers who qualify as emerging growth companies.

That report was released not too long ago on December 20, 2013. However, it seems like the Commission elected to punt on the second part of the legislative mandate (i.e., to provide specifics), at least for now. Unfortunately, as is so often the case with governmental studies, the primary recommendation by the SEC Staff was to conduct further studies and investigations.  While disclosure reform is complex (and may be politically charged), further studies is not what investors or the capital markets need.  Too much money is spent on preparing duplicative and meaningless disclosures.

The report describes in great detail the history and evolution of the disclosure requirements contained in Regulation S-K – the primary source of disclosure requirements for registration statements and periodic reports filed by public companies with the SEC. All of this is well and good for government regulation historians and SEC buffs, but it provides nothing of real value to companies that are or may become subject to these rules and requirements. However, the report provides no real useful guidance to Congress (which may be the point if the SEC would rather control the reform process itself rather than have Congress control the process). Presumably, Congress had included this section in the JOBS Act for a specific purpose:
Continue Reading 4th and 108, SEC elects to punt on Regulation S-K disclosure reform

CEO pay ratio disclosure will not have the intended effectCompensation of public company executives re-emerged back into the public limelight after the recent financial crisis which began in late 2007. The public perception was one of outrage in large part due to the fact that many investors in public companies were experiencing significant losses in their investment portfolios while CEOs and other executives were still being paid record levels of compensation and bonuses.

As a direct result, Congress enacted a number of new laws intended to fix these perceived social injustices, most of which were included in the Dodd-Frank Act. Section 953(b) of Dodd-Frank, for example, was a highly controversial part of Dodd-Frank which directed the SEC to adopt rules requiring  public companies to disclose the ratio of the CEO’s total compensation to that of its median employee. The crux of the controversy surrounding this rule related to how companies should determine median employee salary. Should part-time employees be included or just full-time employees? How should companies treat international employees in countries that have significantly lower relative wages as compared to the U.S.? Another concern of critics was whether the pay ratio metric was useful for investors.

On September 18, 2013, the SEC promulgated proposed rules regarding CEO pay ratio disclosures. As required by the Dodd-Frank Act, the proposal would amend existing executive compensation disclosure rules to require companies to disclose:

  • The median of the annual total compensation of all its employees except the CEO.
  • The annual total compensation of its CEO.
  • The ratio of the two amounts.

The proposed rule would not specify any required calculation methodologies for identifying the median employee in terms of total compensation for all employees.  Instead, it would allow companies to select a methodology that is appropriate to the size and structure of their own businesses and the way they compensate employees.

Like the other SEC disclosure rules mandated by Dodd-Frank, it seems that Congress is attempting to indirectly fix situations it views as problematic for one reason or another by mandating that public companies disclose certain things in their public filings. I presume the thought is that companies will be incentivized to change their practices so as not to be publicly shamed through these disclosures in their public filings. My presumption is supported, to some extent, by
Continue Reading Government mandated pay ratio disclosure will fail to achieve its intended objectives

SEC reminds you to have a disaster recovery planAlmost 10 months since Superstorm Sandy caused widespread destruction to the northeastern U.S., an area not known for frequent hurricane activity, the people and businesses affected have still not fully recovered. As we now reenter the peak of hurricane season, businesses along the eastern seaboard are probably taking a closer look now than in years past at their disaster preparedness in light of last year’s events. The impact of Hurricane Sandy was certainly not limited to the U.S. In reality, there were global implications as, for example, U.S. equity and options markets were closed for two full trading days following the storm. As a result, the SEC, FINRA and the CFTC undertook a joint review of their individual business continuity and disaster recovery planning. Last week, on August 16, these three regulatory agencies issued a joint release outlining some lessons learned and best practices noted in their investigations and review.

The release focused on a number of specific areas including:

  • Widespread disruption considerations;
  • Alternative locations considerations;
  • Vendor relationships;
  • Telecommunications services and technology considerations;
  • Communication plans;
  • Regulatory and compliance consideration; and
  • Review and testing.

The primary motif in the release was that
Continue Reading Hurricanes, flash freezes and other disasters – plan and disclose accordingly or you may be hearing from the SEC

Will the SEC be eliminating the XBRL requirement?It has been four years since XBRL became a four letter word to issuers and nearly eight years since the SEC introduced the concept to issuers, yet XBRL hasn’t fulfilled the SEC’s prediction of XBRL increasing the “speed, accuracy and usability of financial disclosure.”  Largely, the reason for the failed prediction is that many potential users haven’t yet discovered the “usefulness” of XBRL.  Eight years, however, seems like plenty of time for the usefulness of XBRL to catch on.  Given that investors and analysts aren’t using the XBRL data, isn’t it time for the SEC to waive the white flag and eliminate the XBRL filing requirement?

XBRL, of course, was the SEC’s way of racing into the 21st Century.  With high hopes in 2004, then-SEC Chair William Donaldson initiated a study to see how interactive data could benefit the Commission and investors.  In the final rule release, the Commission noted potential benefits such as more financial information being available to investors; less costly and more timely financial information; fewer errors; and increased comparability and interpretation of financial data.  While these benefits have been largely unrealized, the expected costs incurred by issuers have been realized.  Given the ability to look at the XBRL mandate now with real cost and benefit data, it seems that the Commission should re-evaluate the original mandate.

In the meantime, XBRL may be remembered by us in the same vein as Betamax and the Laserdisc – great technology that just never caught on.  Of course, the only difference between failed
Continue Reading Time to throw XBRL in the trash bin?

SEC Chair Mary Jo WhiteThe mission of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation. This sounds great, but how does the SEC actually carry out its mission? The answer lies in the SEC’s oversight and regulation function of the key participants in the securities world, including securities exchanges, securities brokers and dealers, investment advisors, and mutual funds. A key player in how the SEC exercises this function is the SEC Chair, essentially, the SEC’s chief executive.

On April 10, 2013, the SEC announced the swearing in of Mary Jo White as the 31st Chair of the SEC. So who is Mary Jo White? White is a former federal prosecutor, specializing in complex securities and financial institution frauds and international terrorism cases from 1993-2002. After working as a prosecutor, White became a partner at Debevoise & Plimpton where she represented high-profile clients, including JPMorgan Chase & Co, former Bank of America Corp. CEO, Ken Lewis, UBS AG and accounting giant, Deloitte & Touche LLP.

So what’s not to like? The confirmation from the Senate came with little dissent: it voted unanimously in her favor, and its Banking Committee voted 21-1 in her favor. The one nagging criticism of White stems from her ability to effectively navigate conflicting interests. Essentially, some critics fear that her ties to Wall Street will cloud the SEC’s decision-making with respect to these institutions’ behavior during the 2007-09 financial crisis.

Importantly, because of White’s vast experience as both a federal prosecutor and Wall Street defense lawyer, she must, as SEC Chair, recuse herself from investigating former clients for at least a year. Notably, after defending JPMorgan Chase for its role in the financial crisis, for example, White could have to sit out an SEC investigation into the bank’s recent $6 billion trading loss.

Even without consideration of White’s association with Wall Street, she takes over at the SEC at a time of transition, and is faced with grave challenges. According to many, the SEC has been “stuck in a rut” since former SEC Chair, Mary Schapiro, resigned in December of 2012, leaving the SEC’s five-member panel divided between two Democrats and two Republicans.  But White is starting to make changes.  Recently, she appointed Keith Higgins as the new Director of Corporation Finance and appointed acting director, Lona Nallengara, as SEC chief of staff.  Also, President Obama nominated two U.S. Senate aides to replace
Continue Reading New SEC Chair: Mary Jo White

SEC Staff provide insight as to SEC agendaOn Tuesday, the Securities Law Committee of the Society of Corporate Secretaries and Governance Professionals met with officials from the Divisions of Corporation Finance, Investment Management, and Trading and Markets and the Office of the Whistleblower.  While neither new Chair Mary Jo White (confirmed in April) nor new Director of Corporation Finance Keith Higgins (starts at the SEC in June) was present at the meeting, the Staff provided some important takeaways.  Although the two hour meeting covered a significant amount of issues, the most important discussions involved the following topics: 

  • The Staff’s focus will be on Congressional mandates.  Although the Staff couldn’t give timelines, the remaining provisions from Dodd-Frank and the JOBS Act appear to be the focus of upcoming rulemaking activity.   Agenda items such as mandatory disclosure of political contributions, while constantly popping up in the news as imminent, would not fit into the stated focus.  The Staff noted that no one was working on rule making requiring the disclosure of political contributions, which is consistent with Chair White’s Congressional testimony last week. 
  • Issuers continue to have problems with erroneous reports from the proxy advisory firms.  The Staff noted that they continue to receive complaints from issuers specifically regarding errors, difficulty speaking to the correct person at ISS and Glass Lewis, and overlooking key aspects such as an issuer changing its fiscal year.  The Staff has met with ISS and Glass Lewis over the past year and has requested that the advisory firms improve their transparency.  The Society repeated its concerns with the proxy advisory firms and noted that the issues are acute when dealing with smaller issuers.
  • The Office of the Whistleblower is now adequately staffed and deep in implementation mode.  While only one award has been made under the program, no imminent changes are expected, despite the musings of a recent New York Times article. 
  • The Staff did a terrific job in responding to no action requests regarding shareholder proposals.  All but 25 requests were responded to in less than 60 days.  The Staff is very cognizant of the costs of missing printing deadlines and therefore reminds issuers to alert the Staff of not only print deadlines, but also notice and access deadlines.
  • The timeline for the four remaining controversial executive pay provisions of Dodd-Frank remains
    Continue Reading Recent meeting between the Society of Corporate Secretaries and Governance Professionals and SEC Staff provides insight